We consider a two-stage serial supply chain with capacity limits, where each installation is operated by managers attempting to minimize their own costs. A multiple-period model is necessitated by the multiple stages, capacity limits, stochastic demand, and the explicit consideration of inventories. With appropriate salvage value functions, a Markov equilibrium policy is found. Intuitive profit dominance allows for existence of a unique equilibrium solution, which is shown to be a modified echelon base-stock policy. This equilibrium policy structure is sustained in the infinite-horizon. A numerical study compares the behavior of the decentralized system with the first best -integrated capacitated system. The performance of this decentralized system relative to the integrated system across other parameters can be very good over a broad range of values. This implies that an acceptable system performance may be attained without the imposition of a contract or other coordinating mechanism, which themselves may encounter difficulties in implementation in the form of negotiation, execution, or enforcement of these agreements. We find instances where tighter capacities may actually enhance channel efficiency. We also examine the effect of capacity utilization on the system suboptimality. *
Introduction
The inclusion of non-cooperative behavior into operational models adds an additional layer of realism, reflecting the relationships between independent firms in real supply chains, acting in their own self-interest. We include such non-cooperative behavior in a serial supply chain, together with several other elements of realism: production capacity limits, time dynamics, and stochastic consumer demand. All of this is done under the auspices of a model where the firms make production decisions and physical inventory and consumer backlogs are carried from period to period. While horizontal competition is studied in numerous papers (e.g., Parlar, 1988; Lippman and McCardle, 1997) , vertical settings have attracted less attention. Furthermore, the common lexicon used in practice in these settings often de-emphasizes the agents' differing objectives, by referring to them as "partners."
In this paper we are particularly interested to see how two elements observed in virtually all real situations, limited capacity and independent players, affect operations in vertical (serial) settings. We study the simplest setting where both elements are present, i.e., a two-stage competitive capacitated serial systems. We assume that each of two stages is owned separately, but the firms in the channel have the obvious commercial relationship of buyer and seller and a shared economic interest in satisfying the final customers. The model is evaluated over multiple time periods. All parameters and states are considered common knowledge so that all players have full information.
We are interested in the following questions: Is there a unique equilibrium and if not, is there a means of choosing an appropriate equilibrium? Does the structure of the equilibrium policy mirror that of the centralized case? Is there a significant performance gap due to not following the firstbest solution? How does the split of benefits between retailer and supplier influence the efficiency of the whole chain? What is the effect of a more restrictive capacity upon the system efficiency?
The relevant literature can be divided into three categories: multi-echelon research, capacitated research, and competitive research. Clark and Scarf (1960) consider a serial multi-echelon inventory system with holding costs at each stage and penalty costs at the lowest installation for any backordered demand. The optimal inventory policy for the finite-time horizon is an echelon base-stock policy. Federgruen and Zipkin (1984) extend this result to the infinite-time horizon.
The significance of the serial multi-echelon system is illustrated by Rosling (1989) who shows that a pure assembly system may be reduced to a serial system without loss of optimality. Much other work exists for multi-echelon systems; see Tayur, Ganeshan, and Magazine (1999) .
The first papers in the operations literature dealing with capacity decisions in simple one-stage systems include Arrow, Beckmann, and Karlin (1958) . Later, structural properties of operating under capacity constraints dominated a significant portion of this literature. Zipkin (1986a, 1986b) demonstrate that a modified base-stock policy is optimal for a single-stage capacitated inventory system over an infinite horizon. This policy recommends ordering up to a particular inventory level, if possible, but to the capacity level otherwise. Kapuściński and Tayur (1998) extend this to a non-stationary (periodic) demand scenario. In Glasserman and Tayur (1994) several properties are shown for a serial multi-echelon system with capacity limits when a base-stock policy is assumed, but this policy is not demonstrated to be optimal. Parker and Kapuściński (2004) examine a serial two-echelon system under centralized control, where each installation has a production capacity limit and the smaller capacity is at the retailer. The optimal policy is a modified echelon base-stock type, where the ongoing inventory operation can be reserved to a self-reinforcing "band" of inventory state space. The modified echelon base-stock policy is where the supplier will stock no more than the retailer can process in a single period and both installations will attempt to reach desired echelon up-to levels (formally defined in Definition 2). Janakiraman and Muckstadt (2009) consider the same system. Using an alternative method (single-unit single-customer decomposition), they show a multi-level up-to policy is optimal for a system with both a single and two-period leadtime upstream of the supplier, and derive a bound for the number of up-to levels in longer systems. The objective function in the papers cited in both groups above (multi-echelon analysis and capacity) is to minimize the total system costs, i.e., multiple independent decision makers are not considered. Clearly, the advancement of capacity limited inventory research has been surprisingly slow, indicating that the addition of capacity constraints dramatically increases the difficulty of these problems.
In the competitive setting, Cachon and Zipkin (1999) consider a decentralized two-stage (retailer and supplier) inventory game without capacity limits (Cachon, 1999 , considers a lost-sales version of the model). The cost functions of the retailer and supplier in their paper are identical to those in our model. In their settings, the one-period problem is equivalent to the infinite-time problem due to the assumed infinite capacities, as the supplier is always able to reach his desired target level, thus making it a regeneration point, and the retailer can achieve the same inventory distribution in every period. Due to this equivalence, local and echelon games can be compared with the supply chain optimal result from Clark and Scarf (1960) . Such equivalence (between the one-period and infinitehorizon problems) is not readily available for systems with limited capacity, which we consider, since the initial inventory in every period may be arbitrarily low and we cannot guarantee any form of regeneration, so myopic policies cannot be considered.
There have been numerous recent studies investigating various mechanisms to "coordinate" the supply chain, beginning with Pasternack (1985) and including Chen (1999) and Porteus (2000) .
While this is a burgeoning line of inquiry (see Cachon, 2003 , for a summary), we do not design a coordinating mechanism or contract but seek the structure of the equilibrium inventory policy and examine the effects of capacity restrictions upon the system. Moreover, other than the belowcited papers, single-period or infinite-horizon static settings are usually considered, whereas our model is inherently dynamic. Donohue (2000) illustrates the degree of complication of determining and executing contracts which span multiple periods (two in that case). The usage of Markov Games to inventory settings so far has been limited. Hall and Porteus (2000) consider a marketsize dependent newsvendor under competition where the inventory perishes in one period and the only state variable that evolves over time is market size. Olsen and Parker (2008) consider a similar retailer competition setting but they allow for durable inventories and backlogging of unmet demand, so inventory levels in addition to market sizes are carried as state variables from period to period. Otherwise the Markov Game inventory literature is very limited, to the best of our knowledge.
This paper provides contributions on three levels. Firstly, the capacitated inventory theory literature is extended in a non-trivial manner. This paper presents the next logical step beyond the model of Parker and Kapuściński (2004) , the removal of the central ownership assumption.
Secondly, this paper demonstrates an application of dynamic games to an inventory system. The dynamic game methodology has been used only in a limited sense previously in inventory models; namely, for infinite-horizon games. By accommodating the inventory periodic transition function into an infinite-horizon sum, the typical inventory problem is translated into a static representation of the infinite-horizon problem. It is noteworthy that such a representation is potentially susceptible to subgame deviations (see Başar and Olsder, 1999 ). This weakness is not present in our dynamic game formulation. Lastly, the significance of our model is that it addresses three operational issues that are amongst the most important for a firm: (i) capacity constraints, (ii) inventory-related costs, and (iii) inter-firm coordination. Although the costs of installing capacity are not included in the model, we consider the cost of operating with given capacity levels. Thus, firms could subsequently use our model for capacity setting purposes. We explicitly consider inventory holding costs and retailer backlogging costs in every period, in the traditional inventory sense, accommodating overage and underage costs in a stochastic demand environment. And, finally, we explicitly capture the costs associated with a lack of coordination in a supply chain, the cost of decentralized ownership.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model and relate it to the fundamental requirements imposed in the economics literature. Section 3 contains key structural results, followed by related remarks in Section 4. Section 5, based on a numerical study, illustrates system dynamics and sensitivity to critical parameters and allows us to interpret the effects of capacity and competition. We conclude in Section 6.
Model Description
Consider a multiple-period inventory model with a retailer ("her") and a supplier ("him") acting in their own interests. In each period the firms simultaneously decide the amounts to order, mindful they cannot order any more than is available at the immediate upstream installation (the inventory availability constraint) or can be processed in that period (the capacity constraint). It is assumed that the outside supplier providing goods to the upper installation in our system has limitless availability of inventory. The demand is stochastic and stationary and realizations are unknown until after decisions are made. Unsatisfied consumer demand is fully backlogged. The distribution of demand is known to both players. The supplier's and retailer's objectives are to minimize their expected discounted backlogging and holding costs. Since capacity is limited, a large demand realization could result in a significant backlog that may take the system many periods to 'catch up,' resulting in each player being unable to attain their desired (presumed) stock levels. Thus, we explicitly consider a multiple-period (finite-horizon) game with a state (inventory position), which affects the equilibrium decisions in each period. The sequence of events within a period is standard and is listed in the assumptions below. Our objective is to characterize the behavior of both the retailer and supplier. Such behavior should be a subset of all equilibria.
Markov Equilibria and Strategies
We start with a justification of our choice of model in the broader landscape of models of competitive behavior. Game theory has many concepts of equilibrium. An equilibrium is, essentially, a state where no player has a unilateral incentive to deviate from their decision. In a static two-player game, this is a Nash equilibrium given by the intersection of the player's reaction curves (e.g., Kreps, 1990 ).
The Nash equilibrium has shortcomings, however, in more sophisticated settings. Equilibrium refinements are intended to correct some of these problems. In the setting of dynamic games, both subgame perfect and sequential equilibria are commonly used. However, for our purposes, the Markov Equilibrium concept is more appropriate since we wish an explicit dependence upon some state variables and the stochasticity of our model as explained below. A Markov Equilibrium is associated with a Markov game (see Başar and Olsder, 1999) , where the state can differ from period to period. 1 The current state can represent an aspect of the game that is manipulated by the players' actions, often a physical quantity or state. Kirman and Sobel (1974) recognize the dynamics of physical inventory, noting the lack of intertemporal dependence in the extant literature: "whatever any player does in one period does not affect the game in the next period." Cachon and Zipkin (1999) avoid this dependence by considering the infinite-horizon version, endowing them with a static inventory policy. Due to no capacity restrictions, the physical scenario is unchanged at the beginning of every time period resulting in the same equilibrium. Using the infinite-horizon version of Clark and Scarf's (1960) induced penalty cost functions (established by Federgruen and Zipkin, 1984) , they consider infinitehorizon versions of each installation's separated value function. For a finite horizon, the transferral of material between players and delivery of goods to the consumer can actually be described by explicit functions, reminiscent of Clark and Scarf (1960) and Kirman and Sobel (1974) . In the presence of capacity constraints and demand stochasticity, the assumption that all periods begin identically, as in a repeated game context, cannot be used. We apply, therefore, the Markov equilibrium concept to a finite-horizon inventory model.
The appropriateness of ME is described in the economics literature. Maskin and Tirole (2001) provide a good discussion of the merits of MEs. Firstly, Markov strategies prescribe the simplest form of behavior that is consistent with rationality. They depend upon a limited number of variables upon which decisions are based, rather than a sophisticated strategy depending upon a multiplicity of variables and decisions. Secondly, the notion of "bygones are bygones" is reflected in the use of the Markov concept. This suggests that the outcome of a game should only be affected by the strategic elements of that subgame. The third element is the principle that "minor causes should have minor effects," suggesting that the game should only be influenced greatly by factors that are significant. This selection of payoff relevant history needs to be done carefully since the entire usage of the equilibrium concept depends upon it. Duffie, Geanakoplos, Mas-Colell, and McLennan (1994) 1 The term "Markov Perfect Equilibrium" (MPE) is used in some literature to emphasize that these equilibria are subgame perfect. do suggest that "self-justified" sets may be derived rather than imposed. In our modeling situation of a multi-echelon inventory application, the selection of inventory levels at the beginning of each period as state variables seems natural. Indeed, we believe this selection is also justified. Apart from the correspondence to the integrated model (Parker and Kapuściński, 2004) , they are the most relevant to the decisions the players make or factors that affect payoffs so directly since costs are assessed on ending inventory/backorders in each period. 2 We are conscious of the importance of this decision and are aware that any results are qualified by this selection. For further discussions of MEs see also Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, chapter 13), Filar and Vrieze (1997) , and Başar and Olsder (1999).
Formulation
In this section, the model is formulated, the notation is defined, and the assumptions are stated. We are modeling a multi-period two-stage (N = 2) serial system. Each stage denotes a separate firm, attempting to minimize their own cost function. Each stage j ∈ {1, 2} has a capacity limit, K j , where we denote the retailer as stage 1, or installation 1, and the supplier as stage 2, or installation 2. Demand in period n, D, is stochastic and unsatisfied demand is backlogged. Costs include linear physical holding and backlogging penalty costs, charged after demand is realized.
The backlogging penalty cost is shared between the retailer and supplier. This setup is identical to that in Cachon and Zipkin (1999) and similar to Pasternack (1985) . The supplier clearly has a considerable interest in the product being sold and, therefore, shares the cost of the backlog of unsatisfied demand where this cost is interpreted to be the future cost of lost goodwill as a result of insufficient service. This is natural since a supplier (e.g., a manufacturer) would be concerned with the ultimate retail sale of his good; if the retailer is not selling the good, in turn the retailer will not be ordering goods from the supplier. Note that the supplier's share of the backlog cost does not imply a monetary exchange between the parties but an internal cost absorbed due to the insufficient channel service to the customers. 3 It is appropriate to briefly discuss alternatives to the framework we are modeling for unsatisfied demand. Most economic models consider either one or two periods only. In such models there is usually no modeling difference between lost sales and backlogging and it is typical to interpret 2 Clearly the state variables might include the whole history of decisions and actions may depend on inter-temporal properties of own or the competitor's behavior. 3 If a portion of the supplier's backlog cost were a monetary exchange, such a payment could be easily included in the model, by redefining the coefficients of the penalty costs.
lost revenue as the cost of not satisfying the customer. While for short horizons, there may be a difference between sell-in (how much a supplier sells to a retailer) and sell-through (how much a retailer sells to the final customers), in the longer term these are identical and the entire demand which is not satisfied hurts both the retailer and supplier. The actual cost to each of them may be higher or lower than lost or delayed revenue, due to externalities such as the cost of lost goodwill (perhaps resulting in reduced future demand), the cost of transporting a product from an alternative retailer, or buying complementary products. Our approach of assigning the backlogging cost to both the supplier and retailer is very close to these interpretations. An obvious alternative we do not model is to consider a lost-sales or partially lost-sales model. Also, in some supply chains, suppliers and retailers may self-impose particular service levels. In this case, however, the interaction between their policies is modest and, most importantly, by exogenizing service levels, a corresponding level would not reflect one of the critical economic tradeoffs (between having too much and too little inventory) that is central to our model.
We assume that:
• Demand, D, is a random variable with finite mean and second moment and 0
Its continuous probability distribution function is known to both firms. Demands are independent and identically distributed between periods.
• Any unsatisfied consumer demand is backlogged into the next period.
• Deliveries are made in the same periods as the orders placed for those goods, if availability and capacity limits permit.
• All costs and capacity levels are stationary, deterministic, and known by all firms.
• All payoff-relevant information is contained in the state variables, namely the inventory levels at the beginning of each period. Both firms know the inventory levels at both echelons at the beginning of each period.
• Both firms are rational and risk neutral. Both firms discount money at the same rate, β ∈ [0, 1), although this is not necessary for any results.
• When equilibrium A results in lower costs than equilibrium B for both of the firms, B will be discarded (Pareto refinement).
• The retailer and supplier incur inventory carrying cost per unit per period of h 1 + h 2 and h 2 , respectively (h j > 0, j = 1, 2).
• p j is the cost assessed to installation j for each unit of backlog at installation 1, p j > 0.
• Capacities are ordered
The timing of events within a period is as follows: (1) Time is counted backwards from the end of the horizon with period 1 being the final period.
We define the local inventory at installation j at the beginning of period n as x j n and the echelon inventory at echelon j in period n as X j n := j i=1 x i n . That is, the echelon inventory for a firm is the sum of all inventory at and downstream of that firm. Denote the inventory vector asx = (x 1 , x 2 ) and X = (X 1 , X 2 ); the time subscript will be omitted generally. Let a j n be the actual amount ordered by installation j in period n. A j (X) denotes the feasible action set for installation j, noting the possible dependence upon the current inventory position, and A(X) =× 2 j=1 A j (X). The state space is {X ⊂ 2 |X 1 ≤ X 2 }. The inventory transition functions are
where (x) + = max(0, x). The retailer's holding cost (h 1 + h 2 ) reflects the value added by each of the installations. We can substitute with the standard echelon variables as follows:
Using these definitions, the periodic cost functions are rephrased:
Denote the minimizing point of the one-period cost function for echelon 1, L 1 , by y * my . Now we can define the value functions of the model for each player. As backorders are accepted at installation 1 but not at 2, 4 installation 1 may order up to the minimum of K 1 or x 2 . Therefore, the action sets of feasibleỸ s are
and the game is defined as follows:
where the equilibrium operator, "eqm," describes the value of a Nash equilibrium in each period,
given the current state,X, and constraints upon the players' actions, A(X). VectorD is defined as
(the same realization of demand for each vector element, corresponding to echelons).
Our formulation assumes that the initial inventory levels are visible to both players. In the Remarks Section (4), we discuss the effect of various informational assumptions. Clearly such a game is only well defined if the values associated with equilibria in all later periods are specified. As we show later, in the presence of multiple equilibria, each equilibrium has a different value for each player, thus requiring an equilibrium be uniquely determined, the focus of the next section. If uniqueness, or some other means of choosing a single equilibrium, were not possible, each equilibrium path would lead to different costs, thus eliminating the possibility of distinguishing a policy. Noticeably, although V 1 0 and V 2 0 are defined to be zero, separate salvage value functions will be applied in the final two periods. These will be dealt with in the following section.
Competing through Echelon Levels
A natural question is whether the retailer and supplier compete by making decisions about their echelon or installation inventory levels. In the analysis of the centralized model, these two frameworks are equivalent. The choice of echelon-based analysis in centralized settings is due to the simplicity of the analysis and the fact that the optimal policy is actually an echelon-based one.
These two approaches are, however, not equivalent in decentralized settings.
In order to compare them, we first broaden the scope of potential alternatives and consider the sequential and simultaneous games. In a sequential game, with the retailer ordering first and the supplier second, similar to the centralized case, there is no difference between the echelon and the installation game -when the supplier chooses his order, he optimizes his value function. The sequential game might be a reasonable one to consider, if no informational or transportation delays took place. When some lead times are present, it is reasonable to expect that some of the supplier's decisions will be taken in anticipation of the retailer's orders, rather than knowing them for sure, which argues for a simultaneous game when any delays exist.
In the simultaneous game, two known formulations are the installation and echelon games. Both are for mathematical convenience. The actual decisions are order quantities a 1 by the retailer and a 2 by the supplier. Note that deciding a 1 is equivalent to deciding the ending echelon inventory Y 1 for a given X 1 , as
given X 2 . The intuition for the echelon game is straightforward: the supplier controls the total inventory in the two-echelon system but not his installation inventory, while the retailer controls how much of that two-echelon inventory should be moved to her warehouse and stored at a cost.
Such a simple correspondence does not take place in installation variables. Consider the supplier who starts with inventory x 2 and intends to raise it to y 2 . As y 2 = x 2 + a 2 − a 1 , deciding y 2 would require knowing the retailer's order a 1 (the supplier does not control inventory withdrawn a 1 ). In case the retailer withdraws a different quantity than anticipated, the installation level will be different from the intended one, as well. In this sense, in order to guarantee that the installation game results in the desired inventory at the supplier, the game would have to be sequential, with the retailer's decision being observed by the supplier before he makes his own decision.
Since it is difficult to provide any intuition that would justify a simultaneous game in installation levels, we consider a model when agents compete through their echelon levels. As explained below, we are able to limit our analysis to a particular band of the state space, B, defined below. Even with this assumption, many properties naturally holding in centralized models fail in competitive environments. Additional constructs will allow us to overcome these difficulties.
Salvage Value Functions
Salvage value functions are frequently used to (i) reflect economic reality, (ii) overcome undesirable and unrepresentative behavior at the end of the time horizon, or (iii) endow a model with analytical tractability. When remnant stock can be sold at the end of the horizon for some value or additional costs of disposal of unused stock are incurred, negative salvage values can reflect this economic reality. At the end of the horizon, there will frequently be non-stationary ordering behavior in inventory applications. This behavior is unrepresentative of the generally stationary ordering behavior for lengthy time horizons. Using salvage value functions we can modify that end-of-horizon behavior (for our analytical convenience) and these one-time costs in the distant future for reasonably long time horizons have little effect on the actions across most of the preceding periods. Thus, they are a device for generating sustainable behavior for the model.
We define salvage values which allow for sustainable (well defined) equilibria. In general, the end-of-horizon effect of decreasing target levels exists, while, as we explain below, in our competitive setting it is critical that the target inventory levels for both firms do not decrease at the end of the horizon. 5 To achieve this, we design two salvage value functions: a quadratic function for the retailer (Lemma A1 in the Appendix illustrates such a quadratic function's effect upon a singlestage capacitated installation) and a kinked linear function for the supplier. Let us first consider the retailer's salvage value function:
where the appropriately chosen scaling factor λ 1 > 0 and translation factor γ 1 ≥ 0 influence the retailer's order up-to level in period 1, the final period where the retailer makes a decision. Thus,
5 Example: Our approach requires convexities of the objective functions. In the absence of salvage value functions, a non-convexity arises in V 2 functions but this is far less attractive than convexity due to the fact that the sum of unimodal functions is not guaranteed to also be unimodal when the expectation is taken.
The advantage the quadratic salvage value function presents over a linear one is the facility to precisely locate a finite and unique minimizer in period 1. A linear salvage value function with a steep negative linear slope would increase the minimizer in period 1 (compared with a myopic minimizer) but that minimizer likely would become infinity (z 1 1 = ∞). Additionally, by using the quadratic function, we use a smaller portion of the state space at the end of the horizon, which contributes to algorithmic efficiency when solving the model numerically (smaller state space leads to shorter time horizon until convergence). Moreover, when dealing with the derivative dominance analysis in Theorem 2, the quadratic function's contribution to the derivative is a straight line, facilitating the accurate placement of z 1 1 , the retailer's period 1 minimizer. Since the retailer's salvage value function is applied in period 1, z 1 1 depends only on λ 1 , γ 1 , and her economic parameters.
The salvage value function for the supplier is defined as:
+ and is applied in period 2 according to the supplier's value function,
We define γ 2 := z 1 1 . 6 (Notice the time subscript indicates S 2 1 will affect the supplier's ordering decision in period 2, the final period in which he orders.) This choice of γ 2 forces the supplier's minimizing point to be located near the retailer's minimizing point. We define λ 2 as:
Note that Pr(D + D > K 1 ) in equation (3) is referring to the sum of the random demands from two periods. Also note that if the penalty p 2 is small compared to the holding costs, it is not worthwhile for the supplier to hold stock. Formally, if
n has a positive slope with respect to Y 2 , and the effect of the accumulated penalties, starting from the following period (when the current supplier inventory could influence the retailer's inventory position), will never overcome the one-period holding cost and thus a salvage value is not needed; under this extreme circumstance, a salvage function is not necessary and we assume λ 2 = 0. This result is shown in Theorem 3. When p 2 > h 2 (1 − β)/β, we need to define a value of λ 2 that guarantees both that the supplier's cost minimizer is positive and finite, as well as that the up-to levels, which describe an equilibrium, are nonincreasing in n. Within the proof of Theorem 2 we demonstrate how this value of λ 2 allows the dominance of cost function derivatives in neighboring periods. By inserting a negatively sloped salvage value function, we compensate for undesirable end-of-horizon effects and ensure a positive and finite minimizing point of J 2 in the Y 2 dimension during the final 2 periods, which enables the analysis of the model for longer horizons.
Analysis
The following definition and lemma allow us to simplify notation and emphasize the structural elements of the main proofs.
• Let D denote the derivative and ∂ j denote the partial derivative with respect to the jth variable.
For convenience, let us define a subset of the state space, hereafter known as the 'band' and the 'modified echelon base-stock' policy.
Definition 2 (Parker and Kapuściński, 2004) • The band is defined as
B = {X ⊂ 2 |X 1 ≤ X 2 ≤ X 1 +K 1 },
the set of inventory states with the second-stage installation inventory not exceeding
• A policy is a modified echelon base-stock (MEBS) policy if there exist targets T 1 * and T 2 * , such
For the equilibrium policies, we only need to consider actions that result in inventory states in the band B. The intuition behind this result is clear. Since the lower of the two capacities is at the retailer, the supplier can find no benefit in holding more inventory than the retailer's capacity since no more than this level can be drawn in any single period. And since the supplier's capacity exceeds the retailer's and the supplier can order and receive K 1 in one period, the retailer will never be starved of material if the supplier orders K 1 instead of a larger quantity. This logic is formalized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider a system with beginning inventory
X 2 n − X 1 n ≤ K 1 for K 1 ≤ K 2 .
When the set of equilibria is non-empty, a feasible policy such that
Based on the above lemma (the proof is in the Appendix), we assume for the remainder of the paper that both echelons 1 and 2 are aware that it is not beneficial for echelon 2 to be outside of band B.
We state without proof the pure-strategy existence theorem from Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Theorem 1.2), rephrased for our purposes with a cost-minimization criterion. The following two theorems show the existence and properties of the equilibria. Theorem 2 applies when p 2 > h 2 (1 − β)/β and Theorem 3 applies otherwise. Let us first define the following:
Definition 3 describes three attributes of the model in each period: z 1 n is the retailer's minimizing point assuming that the supplier will hold K 1 units of inventory (the upper edge of the band), z 2 n describes the supplier's minimizing point, and B n describes the subset of the band bounded above by the supplier's target stocking level. These points will be later shown to be uniquely defined.
It is convenient to define equilibria in two steps. In the first step we ignore a number of constraints defining feasible states, namely Lemma 1) . We will refer to such constructs as unconstrained response functions, r 1 n (Y 2 ) and r 2 n (Y 1 ), and unconstrained equilibria. In the second step, we incorporate all the omitted constraints. Lemma 2 demonstrates the shape of the unconstrained response functions, which is a critical element of the inductional step in the proof of Theorem 2.
A specific period index has been suppressed in Lemma 2 since we are demonstrating the shape of the unconstrained best response functions based on the properties of the functions in any period.
In Lemma 2, (a)-(d) are assumptions, that allow the derivation of desired properties of each firm's best response functions. 7 This minimization occurs across the second argument for a specific value of the first argument. We subsequently show within the proof of Theorem 2 that z 
Lemma 2 Consider constants U > 0 (upper bound) and φ >
(c) J 11 and J 22 are convex with minima at z 1 and z 2 , respectively; and
Then, the best response functions are
Potential cases considered in Lemma 2 are illustrated in Figure 1 : the left-hand diagram (A)
shows where the equilibrium up-to levels, z 1 and z 2 , intersect outside the band, the center diagram The retailer's one-period costs are minimized at z 1 and her best-response attempts to stay within the band, as long as such behavior decreases the retailer's cost, while knowing that the supplier has no incentive to depart from the band. However, for higher levels of supplier inventory, the retailer's incentives change and there exists a level z 1 above which she will never order. Notice the interval over which the two best-response functions overlap, indicating the existence of multiple equilibria.
Multiple equilibria lead to ambiguity as to the appropriate value of a cost-to-go function. We later show (Theorem 2) that the supplier and retailer both prefer the same equilibrium thus removing this ambiguity; we formally use Pareto refinement to identify this equilibrium. When utilizing Lemma 2 within Theorem 2, z 1 will be become z 1 n , etc. When we discuss separability, we express it as a function of the initial or ending inventories and claim separability of those functions in the range up to the target levels. When referring to separability we do not imply one-period cost minimization but instead minimization across multipleperiod cost functions, which take advantage of the equilibrium policy structure in future periods and
Figure 1: The "unconstrained" response functions for the retailer (thick grey line) and the supplier (thick black line). The left graph (A) applies when z 1 ≤ z 2 − K 1 , the center graph (B) when
(Note that we always have
separability of costs to go. Separability in the context of our model (capacity limited two-echelon inventory game) is not trivial but is driven by the interaction of the following: the feasibility set (physical constraints), the equilibrium behavior of both players in the future, and anticipation of economically justified responses. Furthermore, separation does not take place outside of what we label the band, and not above the equilibrium levels.
Proof of Lemma 2
Note that echelon 2 has no incentive to be outside the band, B.
is convex with minimizer z 2 , we immediately have that, 
Without salvage value functions, the equilibrium up-to levels may be increasing in the horizon length, as in a conventional single-installation inventory model. This presents a possibility of the starting inventory in period 1 being above the period 1 equilibrium, which may lead to a loss of convexity for the following two reasons. First, as we illustrate in more detail below, a change in X 2 modifies the feasible region and requires that the operand needs to be convex in both Y 1 and Y 2 .
Second, above the equilibrium we may lose one of the convexities. The cost function of the supplier echelon inventory is always flat as a function of the retailer's inventory, below the equilibrium basestock levels. However, for the inventory above the up to levels, the cost functions will decrease in the other firm's initial inventory. The technical implication of this is that the convexity of the cost functions is no longer guaranteed except below the equilibrium up-to levels. Thus, the motivation for the equilibrium up-to levels to decrease monotonically in the horizon length towards the steady state levels, which we show in the following theorem through the usage of salvage value functions.
It should be noted that the following proofs necessarily contain numerous cases partly because of the multiple value functions resulting from the game theoretic aspects of the model. The following theorem demonstrates the equilibrium structure and the monotonicity of the equilibrium up-to levels and the separability of the value functions within the band. Recall that z 1 n and z 2 n are defined in Definition 3. 
Theorem 2 Assume p
To facilitate the understanding of the proof of Theorem 2, we provide the following "roadmap" before stating the formal proof.
Roadmap to Theorem 2 The proof of Theorem 2 is by induction, similar to proofs in dynamic programming models. Since the induction step captures the most important logical elements, it is done first, while the basis step is the last element of the proof.
• Figure 1 . The state space is divided into multiple regions between the equilibrium up-to levels in periods n − 1 and n, corresponding to seven possible reference inequalities, (4) to (10) . We demonstrate the same derivative dominance for the value function operand in period n + 1.
• We are now ready to present the proof of Theorem 2. 
Consider the most left of the three rectangles: All the points (
are equilibria, but the point (X 2 , X 2 + K 1 ) (represented by the solid circle) is a dominating equilibrium, as the costs of both echelons are lowest there among all equilibrium points.
height of K 1 above the band B and for greater values of Y 2 it will never return to the band, thus eliminating the possibility of additional equilibria at higher supplier stocking levels.
We start with the inductional step to clearly present the logic of the critical elements of the proof. In order for the inductional step to hold, one of the elements is condition (iii) that the "up-to" values, z j n s, are decreasing in the number of remaining periods n. The initial steps for n = 1, 2 will make it possible -we present them after the inductional step, since they use mostly the same logic.
Induction step, Period n: Assume (i) -(xiii) above with index n − 1 replacing k. Note from (viii),
n (Y 2 ), due to the convexity of J 22 n .
• Unconstrained response functions:
Each of the three boxes in Figure 2 illustrates the feasible set, A(X) =× 2 j=1 A j (X). Note that echelon 2's controllable costs are minimized at z 2 n and that echelon 2 has no incentive to store more than K 1 ; that is, the supplier's best response function remains in the band. Consequently, from Lemma 2, the unconstrained best-reply function (defined as in Lemma 2, that is ignoring the 9 In Definition 3, z current period initial constraints while accounting for the discounted future expected costs) is
The retailer may be better off choosing actions outside of band B and consequently, her response function may depart from it. If the response function is limited to the band,
From induction assumption (xii) and (xiii),
We consider first the unconstrained response functions and unconstrained equilibrium, which ignore the capacity constraints. The conditions of Theorem 1 (strategy spaces are nonempty compact convex subsets of Euclidean space, payoff functions are continuous and quasi-convex in Y i ) are satisfied for a given starting inventory position,X ∈ B; there exists at least one pure strategy equilibrium. As illustrated in Figure 1 (C), a unique equilibrium exists, if
Otherwise, the unconstrained response functions overlap over a range [ where
Given the unconstrained equilibria, the properties (monotonicities) of individual value functions, J i n , and of response functions, we now describe the constrained equilibria (actual equilibria given the initial state). We use the three possible cases, shown in Figure 1 , in which these best-reply func-
In the case when z 2 n < z 1 n , the dynamics are very similar to the extreme case of z 2 n = z 1 n within case (C). Since the logic is the same, we do not explicitly consider this case here. The restrictions on Y 1 in induction statement (vii) are intended to guarantee that all the properties are valid for Y 1 ≤ min(z 2 n − K 1 , z 1 n ), relating to Figure 1(A)(B) . However, in case (C), z 1 n defines the equilibrium. Therefore, all properties are proved in the area up to the equilibrium. Considering case (A) first, we find the equilibrium:
The Pareto dominating equilibrium is clearly a modified echelon base-stock policy, 
demonstrating (i). Due to assumed convexities and separabilities, now we show that
n − K 1 and both terms are non-decreasing, convexity follows thus implying (iv). V 1 n is convex decreasing in X 2 ≤ z 1 n and flat in z 1 n ≤ X 2 ≤ z 2 n , and V 1 n is decreasing in X 2 ≥ z 2 n from inductional assumption (v) for k = n − 1, implying (v) for k = n. V 2 n is convex decreasing in X 2 ≤ z 1 n and flat in z 1 n ≤ X 2 ≤ z 2 n , and convex increasing in
implying (vi) and (vii). The logic is similar for case (B). V
, and convex increasing in X 2 > z 2 n − K 1 ((vi)). Note that J i n is separable from induction assumption (ii) and the separability of L i . The separability of V i n follows due to the fact that the equilibrium in period n depends upon X 1 or X 2 but not a combination of both within a single parameter. This shows (ii).
• Ordering of derivatives and up-to levels:
Let us define the following parameterized reference inequalities, which will permit analysis of the various subcases, using the indices (i, j), where i ∈ {1, 2} denotes firm i and the derivative variable is X j , j ∈ {1, 2}. These reference inequalities will be shown later for specific ranges ofX.
While the comparisons are fairly simple, the complicating factor is that different constraints (and corresponding different formula) describe equilibria in various regions. Figure 3 shows why various comparisons are needed and also gives intuition why they hold. It illustrates the dominance of derivatives for adjacent periods, but also shows why the ordering of base-stock levels is crucial.
Consider case (A) and its two subcases:
Given the needed ordering of thresholds, all of the comparisons are straightforward. For example in Figure 3 , derivatives are 0 below min(z 1 n−1 , z 1 n ), in period n the derivative is positive between z 1 n and z 1 n−1 , while still 0 in period n − 1. The ordering between min(z 1 n−1 , z 1 n ) and the next threshold follows from the inductional step, etc. Formally, we can relate each case and subcase to the reference inequalities (4)-(10) above:
(i, j) = (2, 1): For subcases (I) and (II), same as for (i, j) = (1, 1) for
Now, consider case (B) and its two subcases:
In both these subcases we assume (I)
If this is not the case, the analysis reduces to fewer, simpler cases.
(i, j) = (2, 1): For subcases (I) and (II),
Case (C) has similar logic. Across cases (A), (B), and (C), the following is true
n−1 (X) for i, j = 1, 2, and limited for (i, j) = (1, 2), X 2 ≤ z 2 n , and (i, j) = (2, 1),
Since we are dealing with the territory below the base-stock levels, these dominance conditions also hold for E[V (Ỹ −D)]. Multiplying both sides by β and adding L i to both sides also maintains these conditions, resulting in ∂ j J i n+1 (Ỹ ) ≥ ∂ j J i n (Ỹ ) for i, j = 1, 2, and limited for (i, j) = (1, 2), Y 2 ≤ z 2 n , and (i, j) = (2, 1),
Given the convexity shown for the necessary territory, this is sufficient for (x), which in turn yields (iii). Notice that firm 1's periodic cost (which has a minimum at y * my ) is added to the discounted expected cost-to-go, V 1 n , that is constant in X 1 for X 1 ≤ z 1 n , since the equilibrium is dependent only upon X 2 (and the equilibrium up-to levels for future periods is higher. Formally,
in cases (A) and (B) and for X 1 ≤ z 1 n for case (C). This is preserved under the operation βE[V 1 n (Ỹ −D)] and thus z
• Independence of the best response outside the band:
We now consider the state space above the band,
Thus, the response function r 1 n is within the band (for Y 2 ≤ z 1 n + K 1 it properly describes the best response function when the supplier is not limited to the band). From (xiii), for z 1
, the retailer's best response is independent of Y 2 , r 1 n (Y 2 ) = z 1 n (i.e., it will rise "vertically" in the slice B K 1 above the band), and consequently
, adopting the decreasing convexity from the upper edge of the band, B n ; for z ≤ X 1 ≤ z + K 1 and
. The important element is that the solution follows the upper edge of the band up to min(z 1 n , z 2 n − K 1 ) resulting in the retailer's decreasing convexity in X 1 and a zero slope for both the retailer and supplier with respect to X 2 within B K 1 for X 2 ≤ z + K 1 . Thus, from the assumed convexity of
. These separability and convexity in X 1 properties are preserved for the operation βE[V n (Ỹ −D)]. Adding L 1 (Ỹ ) will then yield J 1 n+1 (Ỹ ) which inherits the convexity and separability properties. As the minimizer of
, the first claim in (xiii) follows. Consequently convexity and monotonicity of J 1 n+1 (Ỹ ) for Y 1 ≤ z 1 n+1 follows. As, V 2 n has zero slope in X 2 for X 2 ≤ z + K 1 and positive slope in X 2 for X 2 > z + K 1 , properties conveyed to J 2 n+1 . Thus, all properties are inherited yielding (xii) forX ∈ B K 1 .
For X 2 ≥ X 1 + 2K 1 , from convexity of J 1 n in Y 1 and the definition of r 1 n , we have Since convexity holds at Y 2 = Y 1 + 2K 1 , it holds across all Y 1 . Also, the increasing convexity of
, which completes (xiii). Consequently, the retailer's best response will not return to the band B for Y 2 > z 1 n+1 + 2K 1 .
Induction Basis:
The salvage value function for player 1 is applied in period 0, while the salvage value function for player 2 is applied in period 1. Mirroring the claims in Lemma A1, for any
. This will guarantee the ordering of derivatives below.
Period 1:
We now allow k to assume values of 0 and 1, corresponding to periods 1 and 2. In Period 1 we have:
Since J i 1 are continuous inỸ , convex in Y i , and the action set, A(X), is nonempty compact convex subset of a Euclidean space (as in the inductional step), from Theorem 1 there exists at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, which occurs at the intersection of best-reply functions. Due to the strict convexity of J 1 1 with respect to Y 1 and the strict monotonicity of J 2 1 , the equilibrium is unique in period 1.
The equilibrium is:
, it is sufficient to show the desired properties for V i 1 . Note that Lemma 1 permits us to restrict attention toX ∈ B only. From the definitions of J i 1 (see above), the period 1 equilibrium, and the separability, we have that V 1 1 and V 2 1 are flat in X 1 ≤ z 1 1 and convex increasing and convex decreasing, respectively, in
is convex and minimized at z 1
. This means that, V i 1 is convex in X i and non-increasing in X −i yielding (v) and (vi). While in any period n ≥ 2, the analysis within band B and outside this band will differ, for period 1 the slope (derivative) of V 1 1 with respect to X 1 is constant in X 2 . Thus, the derived best reply function in period 2, r 1 2 , will be completely vertical along the Y 2 dimension, thus justifying (xiii). Likewise, (xii) is justified since J 1 1 is convex in Y 1 around z 1 1 and J 2 1 is increasing in Y 2 .
Period 2:
From the definition of the salvage value functions above, ∂ 1 S 2 1 (X) = 0 and
so S 2 1 is convex non-increasing in X 2 and independent of X 1 . Thus, S 2 1 + V 2 1 is convex in X 2 and non-increasing in 
] has these same properties, yielding (iv) and (v). This establishes the basis convexity conditions. Specifically, 
will be non-negative, sufficient to establish (ix) for the retailer, and combined with the convexity results, sufficient to show (x) for the retailer. It is straightforward to see the equilibrium solution is
To establish the basis for z 2 n+1 ≤ z 2 n , however, we need to consider an additional period since z 2 1 = −∞. Clearly, there exists the freedom to choose values of γ 1 and γ 2 to achieve z 2 2 ≤ z 1 1 , which we do (partially establishing (iii)).
We consider the same three cases:
Consider first (A). Using the derived equilibrium solution (Y 1 , Y 2 ) above, we have
For
has a finite minimizer in X 2 and V 2 1 (X) + S 2 1 (X) has a finite minimizing point with respect to X 2 due to the functional shape of S 2
since we assume condition (c) of the theorem statement holds. To see condition (c) is sufficient,
In case (B), in period 2, for
and following the same steps, we achieve
showing the final part of (x), implying z 2 3 ≤ z 2 2 , yielding (iii), due to the convexity already shown. The analysis deriving the properties for firm 1's best reply function outside the band is very similar to that in the induction step, but slightly simpler since r 1 2 (Y 2 ) is completely straight for values of Y 2 ≥ Y 1 + K 1 , above the band B. This completes the basis.
The following theorem holds for p 2 ≤ h 2 (1−β)/β, that is, where the unit holding cost exceeds the discounted infinite sum of penalty costs for the supplier. The structure of the equilibrium policy, while similar to that of Theorem 2, has the supplier never ordering goods, resulting in a much simpler analysis. However, the retailer wishes to bring her inventory position to the newsvendor level. Thus, the firms' desired inventory positions are incompatible. 
n (X 2 ) for i = 1, 2, and n > 0.
and r 2 1 (Y 1 ) = X 2 , creating a unique equilibrium. Thus,
Multiplying by β and adding the periodic cost generates J i n which have all the requisite properties and specifically,
1−β ≥ 0 from the condition in the theorem.
Now we present a result demonstrating how the equilibrium up-to levels change with the economic parameters and the constraining capacity.
Theorem 4
The equilibrium up-to levels are non-increasing when K 1 , h 1 , or h 2 increase or when
Proof See the Appendix.
The final analytical result pertains to the applicability of the finite-horizon equilibrium policy to the infinite-horizon. While extending finite-horizon results to infinite-horizon has become fairly standard in in traditional DP settings with one decision maker, it is not quite the case in game-theoretic settings. It is possible, however, to lean on some of the convergence results in the economics literature, as described below.
For the remainder of this section, we will count time forward (with an increasing index). To avoid confusion, we will use an index T rather than n used previously for counting time backwards.
We use the following standard terminology applied to our setting. The strategy space truncated at period T will be labeled S(T ).
Definition 4 g * ∈ S(T ) is an ε-perfect Nash equilibrium if for each time 0 ≤ s ≤ T , history x, strategy g ∈ S(T ) and player
be labeled a perfect Nash equilibrium.
The following result comes from Fudenberg and Levine (1983) (hereafter FL83) and will be directly used in the proof of Theorem 6. While FL83's Theorem 3.3B assumes a deterministic game, footnote 2 on page 253 and section 6 (in FL83) state that the results hold for stochastic systems. 11
Theorem 5 (Fudenberg and Levine, 1983, Theorem 3.3B) Suppose V is uniformly continuous. A necessary and sufficient condition that g * be perfect in S(∞) is that there be sequences
ε k , T (k), and g k such that g k is ε k -perfect in S(T (k)) and as k → ∞, ε k → 0, T (k) → ∞,andg k → g * .
Theorem 6
The modified echelon base-stock equilibrium policy shown for the finite-horizon is also the equilibrium policy in the infinite horizon for β ∈ [0, 1).
11 This assertion is corroborated by Börgers (1989) . This is done by extending the result to games "in which Nature may make moves that are not completely observable; we will, however, continue to assume that the past actions of the players are common knowledge" (FL83). The stochastic game with no observability of actions, requires the constraining assumption of a finite-action space. Such a restriction is not needed for full-information games as ours.
Proof We will use Theorem 5. Specifically, we will demonstrate that the following sufficient conditions are satisfied: (i) the value function is uniformly continuous,
. g k denotes a ε k -equilibrium for a k period problem, within S(k) the space of strategies, and g * is the perfect equilibrium in the infinite horizon.
For our purposes, we will choose an arbitrary sequence ε k approaching zero and (ii) trivially holds. We will show (iii) holds for any arbitrary ε > 0. Convergence of policies (and of equilibria)
is in the same topology as in FL83, where the distance between policies v and w is defined as
is the state in period
T when following policy v. This distance notation may accommodate any of the standard metrics:
sum of absolute differences ("Manhattan distance"), maximum of absolute differences (we use a modification of this one, adopted directly from FL83), square root distance.
For (iii), we need to first define g * . g k is the (perfect) equilibrium for the k-period game defined
, which exists due to monotonicity and boundedness of (z 1 k , z 2 k ) and let g * be the corresponding MEBS policy. For an initial starting pointX 1 in period 1 and a demand sample path
). We will show that g k → g * . Consider any ε > 0. We will take advantage of the fact that the distance metric does not exceed one. We will define T and m such that 
This implies the inventory differences are smaller than the difference in zs which are smaller than ε, i.e., (1/ 
. This establishes the required convergence g k → g * (we have used strong, sample-path bounds here, that are independent of demand realizations). To show (i) that the value function is uniformly continuous, it is sufficient to show that
where total cost V (v) is expressed as a function of ordering policy v. This is straightforward due to the combination of the following three factors: the definition of distance between strategies, linearity of costs, and capacity constraints. Specifically, let ε > 0 and let m 0 := 1/ε − 1.
. Clearly, as ε → 0 we have β m 0 → 0 and uniform continuity follows.
Remarks
In this section we discuss some issues and variants of our model and the results.
• Longer supply chains: A natural question is whether the current two-installation model can be extended to three or more installations. The enabling result, Lemma 1, fails for serial systems greater than two installations. The equilibrium dominance for the upstream installations which maintain stocking levels of K 1 or less, can no longer be guaranteed. Without this result, the primary result, Theorem 2, cannot follow.
• Leadtimes: We assume that delivery leadtimes are "natural" (or single period) leadtimes upstream of both the supplier and retailer. As aptly illustrated by Glasserman and Tayur (1994) , leadtimes upstream of the supplier effectively mimic additional installations with single-period leadtimes, and as discussed in the preceding discussion point, supply chains of greater than two echelons cannot easily be analyzed. Leadtimes which are integer multiples of the period can be incorporated between the supplier and retailer.
• Capacity constraints vs. storage constraints: In a one-period setting the production capacity constraints could be interpreted as storage limits. This equivalence does not hold for longer horizons, but storage limits actually would be far easier to characterize and analyze since they merely act as a limit upon the up-to decision variables as currently formulated in Section 2.
• Common knowledge assumptions:
The current informational requirements of the system are that each firm knows the beginning inventory levels of themselves and the other firm. Given the decentralized nature of the problem, the obvious question is whether sufficient information can be contained in the retailer's orders. Note that as opposed to centralized models, the sequence of decisions is critical in decentralized models. Cachon and Zipkin (1999) consider a decentralized model with infinite capacities. In their model, both supplier and retailer have access to demand information (or equivalently retailer inventory) right away. Otherwise, the supplier would learn about demand with a one period delay. 12 We assume, as in Cachon and Zipkin (1999) that demand information is available immediately to both the retailer and supplier. Note, however, that despite truncation of the order size, the actionable knowledge might remain the same as in Cachon and Zipkin (1999) . This would happen under two different implementations. Assume temporarily that the target stocking levels are stationary. The retailer may (i) reorder up to her target level, (ii) truncate the order to the capacity level. Clearly in case (i), reordering to the same level implies that the order is equal to demand in the previous period and all information is passed to the supplier. In case (ii), despite truncating the order, the actions of the supplier are not influenced (since, when demand is larger than capacity, the supplier will anyhow not order more than capacity). Clearly, with target levels decreasing in the horizon length, the same logic holds, but the supplier needs to compensate for the difference between successive target levels. If, however, orders are also truncated due to the availability of inventory at the supplier, some additional information may be lost. Thus, the specifics of implementated ordering policy may influence the transfer of information.
• Linear purchasing costs: The purchasing transaction between the supplier and retailer is notably absent in the formulation. The explanation for omission is simple: a linear purchase cost (for the retailer) or revenue (for the supplier) does not change any structural results (as first pointed out by Veinott, 1966) . Inserting this purchasing cost will merely "rotate" the cost functions of each firm, shifting the minima but not changing the policy structure.
Including a linear retail price or supplier purchase cost of raw materials, likewise will similarly shift the equilibrium up-to levels but not the policy structure.
• Lower capacity at the supplier: The sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium (functional convexity) disappear when the smaller of the capacities is held by the supplier.
Given the lack of easy-to-describe structure for the centralized version of the problem, it is not entirely surprising that the convexity does not hold in the decentralized supply chain.
• Coordinating mechanisms: While we do not explicitly seek coordinating contracts but merely consider enhancement of channel efficiency, we are aware that this is an active research area. Cachon and Zipkin (1999) have shown that a three parameter contract can coordinate in an uncapacitated two-echelon system. Clearly, three parameters are sufficient to coordinate a 12 Since the retailer and supplier make ordering decisions simultaneously, the last period demand would be revealed to the supplier through the current-period retailer's order, which is too late for the current-period supplier's decision. capacitated system. Consider, for example, sharing the each firm's physical inventory cost and each firm sharing the retailer's backlog cost in the same proportion. Since such a contract is equivalent to total cost sharing, these contracts are considered complicated, resisted and not observed in practice, to the best of our knowledge.
Numerical Examples
In this section we consider some numerical examples drawn from solving the model for sample data.
In all the examples we use discretized probability distributions approximating a normal distribution with a mean of 9.8 with different values of variance, and various levels for the discount factor, β.
The models were iterated until both firms' value functions converged to within a margin of 0.005 (difference between subsequent periods). For all the following examples, we assign h 1 + h 2 = 1 and β = 0.95. In all the numerical examples, the echelon base-stock levels of the decentralized system were always lower than the echelon base-stock levels of the integrated system. This suggests competition reduces channel stocks, an observation compatible with the well-known double marginalization result. The lower these cost curves, the closer the system is to the integrated model (first-best solution).
The first observation is the high degree of consistency in percentage value above the integrated cost, for a wide range of total penalty values, values from 1 to 50. Although not shown, this degree of consistency is maintained for far greater values of p 1 + p 2 , too. This implies that the system's total cost is relatively independent of the values of the total penalty, for non-extreme values of α.
Another observation is that at the extreme values of α, the cost increases dramatically, but as there is a more equitable sharing of the total penalty cost, the system cost decreases significantly, getting within 20% above the integrated cost for all the curves shown. For other parameter combinations the efficiency can be shown to get to 5-10% above the integrated cost, establishing fairly efficient solutions of the system through the natural operation of the decentralized channel. Clearly, at extremely low values of α, the retailer has a very small share of the total penalty and the retailer and their potential lack of clarity about their respective responsibility for the backlogging penalty, the "decentralization" penalty upon the channel profits is not overwhelming. The attractiveness of this observation is that no third party ("principal") needs to impose their will upon the players in the system, or attempt to force potentially unwilling players to sign a contract to coordinate the system; a good system solution is achieved merely from the normal operation of the supply chain.
In Figure 5 the unit holding cost of the supplier, h 2 , is varied from 0.1 to 0.9 while the unit holding cost of the retailer is kept constant, h 1 + h 2 = 1. Note that a wide range of this ratio (between 0 and 100%) is driven by a possibility that a different portion of the value-added activities are performed in one of these two stages. As in Figure 4 , the additional system cost relative to the integrated cost is plotted against the penalty split, α. What we first observe is that at lower values of α, the inefficiency is higher, as before. The curve with the highest cost here (at α = 0.05) is h 2 = 0.1 and the relative costs decrease as h 2 increases. At the other end of the scale (at α = 0.95), the sequence of the curves is reversed. A potential explanation for the ordering at each extreme value of α is that there is an imbalance of the values of the parameters. For example, at α = 0.05, the unit costs are p 1 = 0.05, p 2 = 0.95, h 1 + h 2 = 1, and h 2 varies: (a) when h 2 = 0.1 the ratio of holding to penalty cost is low for the supplier while it is high for the retailer, so the system becomes unresponsive to customers, driving up costs; (b) when h 2 = 0.9 the holding to penalty cost for the retailer is unchanged but it is far closer to unity for the supplier, so he is more measured in his approach and is less anxious to carry extra stock to satisfy customers, so he is closer in attitude to and coordinate, resulting in a total system cost closer to the integrated cost. A further observation is that generally the curves appear to be fairly closely aligned across the scale of α (for non-extreme values), and that there is a great deal of "flatness" of the curves (loosely speaking), implying a robustness with respect to α, a desirable property as indicated earlier.
In the next few charts, we consider the effect of varying the capacity constraint (in these examples, the mean of the distribution is 9.8 and the standard deviation is about 4, resulting in a coefficient of variation of over 0.4). Figure 6 shows that at the extreme values of α the more constrained systems (lower values of K 1 ) have higher relative additional system costs but as the penalty costs are shared more equitably, these more constrained decentralized systems have lower relative additional system costs than the less constrained systems. There are two potential reasons for the players to attempt to coordinate: (1) they are both sharing the backlogging costs and thus have an incentive to satisfy customers' demand; and (2) there are fewer alternatives and this forces the retailer and supplier to coordinate even more closely. This effect of having a tighter constraint resulting in closer to coordinating behavior is not initially intuitive. In Figure 7 , we find that the most constrained system (K 1 = 10) has the highest absolute costs. In most cases, while the "decentralization" penalty is small for a tight capacity, it does not imply low costs in absolute terms. In the centralized system, we observe the systemwide costs are monotonically increasing as the constraining capacity (K 1 ) decreases. In the decentralized system, this property is frequently true. However, we have observed circumstances when a tightening capacity may actually decrease absolute total system costs, as seen in Figure 7 when comparing the K 1 = 11 and K 1 = 12 curves. In Figure 8 we have duplicated two of the curves from Figure 6 , namely those for K 1 = 10 and
We can observe the effect more clearly where the K 1 = 10 curve reaches closer to the for extreme values of α. In Figure 9 , these total cost curves from Figure 8 are separated for each player, and displayed as a percentage of the total system costs. Firstly, the supplier's share of the total cost curves decreases and the retailer's share of the total costs increases as α increases, as we expect. However, a more interesting observation is that, as there is an increase in capacity from K 1 = 10 to K 1 = 11, both players' absolute costs decrease. But the retailer's share of the total cost decrease and supplier's share of the total cost increase. An intuitive explanation for this could be that since the retailer is not constraining the system as much as before, she should not carry as much of the cost burden (similar to the induced penalty cost functions in Parker and Kapuściński, 2004) . We can consider the holding and penalty costs of each player. The total holding costs for the retailer will go down since she does not need to hold as much safety stock, and her total penalty costs will decrease since she will be able to satisfy the customers more easily since the capacity will not be limiting the flow of stock through the system. For much the same reason, the supplier's total penalty costs will be reduced, also. However, there is ambiguity as to whether the supplier's holding costs will increase or decrease. They could increase as the larger capacity allows more material to be processed. They could also decrease similar to the decrease in the retailer's base-stock level.
Clearly the sum of the supplier's holding and penalty costs (as a share of the total) increase as the capacity increases.
Conclusion
In this paper we model a decentralized serial two-stage multi-echelon inventory system with capacity constraints and stochastic demand. Using the Markov Equilibrium solution concept we demonstrate the existence and properties of the equilibrium policy of our model in a multiple-period context. The equilibrium policy is a modified echelon base-stock policy, identical in structure to the optimal policy in the centralized system. The modification is where the inventory levels are naturally restricted to a band of the state space. While the usual convexities are lost in this competitive framework, we utilize salvage value functions to generate base-stock levels monotonically decreasing in the length of the horizon and establish existence of either a unique equilibrium or Pareto dominating equilibria in every period. There are some subtle differences depending on the value of the supplier's unit penalty cost. Specifically, when the supplier's penalty cost is sufficiently small, the supplier will stock no inventory at all and the retailer will attempt to order up to the myopic level. We formally show that the equilibrium echelon base-stock levels are non-increasing when K 1 increases, when h 1 or h 2 increase, or when p 1 or p 2 decrease.
In a numerical study, we evaluate the behavior of the decentralized system and compare it to the first best. It appears that the penalty costs (p 1 + p 2 ) and split of the penalty costs (α), for non-extreme values, do not affect the relative total costs greatly, but the capacity limits do and in interesting ways. It appears that a tighter capacity can coordinate the system quite effectively by forcing the players to cooperate more closely, resulting in a total system cost closer to that of the integrated model. Thus, through the natural operation of the supply chain, some enhancement (not coordination) of the channel efficiency is observed through tighter capacity, rather than attempting to apply a coordinating contract. 13 We observe that, the decentralization penalty is not heavily influenced by the split of the penalty between the players, suggesting reasonably robust predictions of the efficiency gap. Altogether, the numerical study re-inforces the importance of explicitly modeling the capacity constraints rather than merely taking an uncapacitated model as an approximation to a capacity constrained one. n −Y 1 n = K 1 and Y 1 n = Y 1 n and π = π for all future periods (the variables under policy π are denoted with the notation). Specifically, the supplier orders a smaller amount in period n under policy π compared with policy π (a 2 n − a 2 n = Y 2 n − Y 2 n ), but compensates in period n − 1 by ordering more, resulting in the same inventory levels at the end of period n − 1 under both policies. Notice that the policies are identical from period n − 2 onwards.
A Additional proofs
The actions in period n − 1 are not the same, but these result in the same ending inventories at the end of period n − 1.
Recall from the formulation in §2 that as denote the amount ordered. To check the feasibility of . Note, L is a monotone non-decreasing function with limit h, thus establishing the existence of τ 1 (as L (τ ) and the weighted average of L (τ − D), both increase and converge to h, the difference converges to 0 and is guaranteed not to exceed for sufficiently high τ s). We are interested in the territory y ≤ y * 1 : 
Basis for Induction
Let us now consider models satisfying condition (a). Consider the economic parameters (h 1 , h 2 , p 1 , p 2 ) first. (Salvage value functions are the same for the different values of these parameters.) We consider the case for h 1 in depth and describe briefly how the other three cases differ slightly: 
